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CHAPTER 2

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAWS
OF WAR
WAR AND LAW
Although the resort to war is generally prohibited by the Charter of the
United Nations, it is exceptionally permitted as an enforcement measure
taken by or on behalf of the United Nations and as a measure of individual
or collective self-defense against at;t armed attack. However, the distinction must be made between the resort to war and the conduct of war.
Whether the resort to war is lawful or unlawful the conduct of war is
regulated by the system of rules known as the lavvs (or rules) of war.
These rules regulate the conduct of war on land, at sea, and in the air.
The laws of \var are designed to control and mitigate the harmful effects of
war by extending, during time of war, at least a minimum standard of
protection to combatants and noncombatants and to all individuals who
come under the control of the belligerents. These laws are also helpful in
regulating the transition to peace at the conclusion of active hostilities.
The laws of war are effective to the extent that they are obeyed by the
belligerents. 1
2oo

THE SOURCES OF THE LAWS REGULATING WARFARE 2
The principal sources of the laws of war are custom and treaties.
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CUSTOMARY LAW
Customary laws of war develop out of the usage or practice of states
when such usage or practice attains a degree of regularity and is accompanied by the general conviction that behavior in conformity vvith this
usage or practice is both obligatory and right. 3 In a period marked by
frequent resort to armed conflict, customary law may develop within a
short time. 4
211

TREATIES
Treaties, or conventions as they are somettmes called, are international
agreements between two or more states. Certain conventions represent a
codification of the rules of war already established by custom. There are
also conventions by which new laws of war are created. Both types of
conventions have provided the more important developments in the rules
of war. 5

2.12

(Footnotes at end of chapter)
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BINDING FORCE OF RULES REGULATING WARFARE
a. CusToMARY RULES oF wAR are binding on all belligerents and under
all conditiohs. 6 Special rules apply in cases of reprisals against a belligerent
for illegitimate acts of warfare. (See Section 310.)
b. RuLES EsTABLISHED BY TREATIES. Rules established through a convention (treaty) are usually binding only between parties which have
ratified or adhered to, and have not thereafter denounced or withdrawn
from, the convention. Furthermore, the rules established through a convention are binding only to the extent permitted by the terms of the convention or by the reservations, if any, that have accompanied the ratification of or adherence to the convention. However, even when the above
requirements are not met, a convention may represent, or come to represent,
a general consensus as to the established law. Hence, the widespread
observance of these conventional rules frequently renders them enforceable
as law regardless of ratification. 7 As occasions arise, it is the responsibility of higher authority to determine and instruct forces afloat as to which,
if any, of these conventions are not legally binding between the United
States and other states immediately concerned, and as to which, if any, are
for that reason not to be observed or enforced for the titne being.
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THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE LAWS OF WAR
Among the customary rules of warfare there are three rules frequently
referred to as the" basic principles of the laws of war": military necessity,
humanity, and chivalry. 8 These rules, or basic princi pies, are defined as
follOW'"S:
a. MILITARY NEcESSITY. The principle of military necessity 9 pennits a
belligerent to apply only that degree and kind of regulated force, not otherwise prohibited by the laws of war, 10 required for the partial or complete
submission of the ene1ny with the least possible expenditure of time, life,
and physical resources.
b. HuMANITY. The principle of humanity prohibits the employment of
any kind or degree of force not necessary for the purpose of the war, i. e.,
for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with the least possible
expenditure of time, life, and physical resources.n
c. CHIVALRY. The principle of chivalry forbids the resort to dishonorable
(treacherous) means, expedients, or conduct. (See Section 64o.)
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THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANTS AND NONCOMBATANTS
a. DisTINCTION. The traditional laws of war are based largely on the
distinction made between combatants and concombatants. In accordance
with this distinction, the population of a belligerent is divided into tw·o
general classes: the armed forces (combatants) and the civilian population
(noncotnbatants). 12 Each class has specific duties and rights in time of
war, and no person can belong to both classes at the sa1ne time.
2.2.1
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b. RESTRICTION OF HOSTILITIES. UnJer CUStOtnary international law individuals who do not fo tm a part of the armed forces and who refrain from
the con1mission of all acts of hostility must be safeguarded against injury
not incidental to military operations directed against combatant forces and
other military objectives.l 3 In particular, it is forbidden to 1nake concombatants the object of a direct attack by the armed forces of a belligerent,
if such attack is unrelated to a military objective. 14 Attack for the sole
purpose of terrorizing the civilian population is also forbidden. 15

2.30 NEUTRALITY
a. DEFINITION. Neutrality may be defined as the nonparticipation of a
state in a war between other states. Such nonparticipation must in turn
be recognized by the belligerents. In the absence of any treaty limiting
the available scope of neutrality (see Article 2.32.), whether or not a state
chooses to refrain from participating in war is a policy decision. Similarly, recognition of such nonparticipation is also a policy decision.
b. OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS. Under general international law a neutral
state has certain obligations and rights toward belligerents, and belligerents have corresponding rights and obligations toward a neutral (see
Section 440). The principle of impartiality holds that a neutral state is
required to fulfill its obligations and enforce its rights in an equal manner
toward all belligerents. H a neutral state does not observe the principle
of impartiality the belligerent injured by such nonobservance may consider
itself to be bound no longer by its obligations toward the neutral. 16
2.31 THE DETERMINATION OF NEUTRAL STATUS OF STATES
Although it is usual, on the outbreak of war, for nonparticipating states
to issue proclamations of neutrality, a special declaration by nonparticipating states of their intention to adopt a neutral status is not required. 17
The status of neutrality is terminated only when a neutral state resorts to
war against a belligerent or when a belligerent resorts to war against a
neutral. 18
2.32.

NEUTRALITY UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS
The Charter of the United Nations imposes upon the member states the
obligations to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and to
refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations. The
obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force is modified by the right
of individual and collective self-defense to be exercised in case of an armed
attack until the Security Council has taken the necessary measures to restore
peace and by the obligation to carry out the decisions of the Security
Council. In case of a threat to or breach of the peace, the Security Council
is authorized to take enforcement action, involving or not involving the
use·of armed force, in order to maintain or restore peace. The member
states are obligated to give the United Nations every assistance 1n any
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action it takes and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against
which the ·united Nations is taking action. Consequently, the members
of the United Nations may be obliged to give assistance with their armed
forces to the United Nations in its enforcement actions, the fulfillment of
which obligation is incompatible with the status of neutrality. On the
other hand, n1ember states may be obliged to give assistance to the United
Nations in its enforcement actions only with measures not involving the
use of armed force. In this case, they may remain neutral, since they are
not obliged to participate in the hostilities, although they are obliged not
to observe an attitude of impartiality toward the belligerents. These
obligations of the member states, incompatible with the status of neutrality
and with the principle of impartiality, come into existence only if the
Security Council fulfills the functions delegated to it by the Charter. H
the Security Council is unable to fulfill its assigned functions, the members
may, in case of a war, remain neutral and observe an attitude of strict
impartiali ty. 19

NEUTRALITY UNDER REGIONAL AND COLLECTIVE SELFDEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS
The right of individual and collective self-defense established by the
Charter of the United Nations may be implemented by regional and collective self-defense arrangetnents. Under these arrangements the possibility of maintaining a status of neutrality and of observing an attitude of
impartiality depends upon the extent to which the contracting parties are
obliged to give assistance to the regional action, or in the case of collective
self-defense, to the victim of an armed attack. 20
2.33

2.40 THE LAWS OF LAND WARFARE
Naval forces operating on land will be governed by the laws and customs
of war on land. 21
2.50 THE LAWS OF AIR WARFARE
There is no co1nprehensive body of laws specially applicable to air warfare in the same sense that there is a comprehensive body of specialized laws
relating only to sea warfare and· a similar body of laws relating only to
land warfare. 22 There are, however, certain custotnary and conventional
rules of a general character underlying the conduct of war on land and at
sea which must be considered equally binding in air warfare. 23 In addition,
there are certain specialized laws of sea and land warfare which ·may be
considered applicable to air warfare as well. 24
This book applies to the whole of naval warfare and thereby includes
naval air warfare. Appropriate note is taken throughout this book of the
situations in which the specialized rules of naval warfare do not similarly
regulate the conduct of naval air warfare. In the absence of these distinctions, operational naval commanders are to assume that the rules regulating
warfare at sea are equally applicable to naval air warfare.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2
1 This statement does not refer to occasional violations of the rules of warfare . Such occasional violations do not substantially affect the validity of the law. However, the continuous
violation of certain rules of warfare is a different matter, especially when such violations are
not answered by protests and reprisals on the part of the belligerent against whom they are
taken. Hence, reference is made here to this question: When do rules of warfare, either customary or conventional, cease to be valid for the reason that over a period of time they are neither
obeyed nor applied by belligerents?
The experience of World War II, and of the war crimes trials. which followed, seems to
indicate quite clearly that the present principal area of uncertainty in the rules of war is that
relating to the permissible methods and weapons for the conduct of actual military operations
against members of the armed forces and the civilians who suffer as a result of such operations.
2 Section 2.10 is limited to a consideration of the international regulation of warfare, and does
not cover national regulation by the United States, which is dealt with in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and U. S. Navy Regulations.
3 It is necessary to distinguish clearly between the usages of warfare (manner of warfare)
and the customs of warfare. The development from usage to custom is a decisive one since,
in a strict sense, it is only after a usage or practice has developed into a custom-i. e. only
after a certain behavior is generally considered as both obligatory and right-that we are
entitled to speak of legal rules of warfare.
In recent years there has been a marked tendency to include among the sources of the rules
of war certain principles of law adopted by many states in their domestic legislation. In the
judgment rendered in The Hostages Case the United States Military Tribunal stated:
"The tendency has been to apply the term "customs and practices accepted by civilized
nations generally," as it is used in International Law, to the laws of war only. But the
principle has no such restricted meaning. It applies as well to fundamental principles of
justice which have been accepted and adopted by civilized nations generally. In determining
whether such a fundamental rule of justice is entitled to be declared a principle of international
law, an examination of the municipal laws of states in the family of nations will reveal the
answer. If it is found to have been accepted generally as a fundamental rule of justice by
most nations in their municipal law, its declaration as a rule of international law would
seem to be fully justified." (United States v. List et al.) Trials of War Criminals, Vol.
XI (195o), p. 12.35.
4 It is frequently difficult to determine the point in time at which a usage of war has developed into a customary rule. In addition, it has been a characteristic feature of the customary
law of war that there have been numerous controversies between states over the precise content
of these rules once their existence as law has been definitely established. These difficulties,
among others, have led in the past to increased effort toward the codification of the law of war
through written conventions (treaties).
5 The most recently concluded international conventions relating to the regulation of the
conduct of warfare are the 1949 Geneva Conventions For the Protection of War Victims.
6 See Note 10 below for a discussion of the effect of the principle of military necessity upon
the binding force of customary laws of war.
7 Numerous multilateral agreements contain a ptovision similar to that contained in Article
2.8 of Hague Convention No. XIII (1907); namely, that "The provisions of the present convention
do not apply except to the contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties
to the convention." The effects of this so called "general participation" clause have not been
as far-reaching as might be supposed. In World Wars I and II belligerents frequently affirmed
their intention to be bound by agreements containing the general participation clause regardless
of whether or not the strict requirements of the clause were actually met. Furthermore, certain
conv~ntions have been generally regarded either as a codification of preexisting customary law
or as having come to represent, through widespread observance, rules of law binding upon all
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states. Both the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and For the Far East treated
the general participation clause in Hague Convention No. IV (1907), Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, as irrelevant. They also declared that the general principles laid
down in the 192.9 Geneva (Prisoners of War) Convention, which does not contain a general
participation clause, were binding on signatories and non-signatories alike. Article 2., paragraph 3, of all four 1949 Geneva Conventions states:
"Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the
Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They
shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter
accepts and applies the provisions thereof.''
8 The confusion surrounding the principles of military necessity and of humanity is due
largely to the fact that they have been used in two distinctly different senses. There has been
a failure to clarify these two meanings. They may be, and often are, referred to as principles
or ideals which, though not possessing the status of law, have been significant in their influence
upon the course of development of the law of war. On the other hand, the principles of
military necessity and of humanity also form a part of the positive law of war. This is the
second sense in which they may be used, and it is in this sense that these principles are referred
to in Section 2.2.0.
9 An excellent definition of the principle of military necessity is found in the following
quotation:
''Military necessity has been invoked by the defendants as justifying the killing of innocent
members of the population and the destruction of villages and towns in the occupied territory.
Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount
and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible
expenditure of time, life and money. In general, it sanctions measures by an occupant
necessary to protect the safety of his forces and to facilitate the success of his operations. It permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons whose
destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the war; it allows
the capturing of armed enemies and others of peculiar danger, but it does not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the satisfaction
of a lust to kill. The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law. There must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property
and the overcoming of the enemy forces. It is lawful to destroy railways, lines of communication, or any other property that might be utilized by the enemy. Private homes and
churches even may be destroyed if necessary for military operations. It does not admit
the wanton devastation of a district or the willful infliction of suffering upon its inhabitants
for the sake of suffering alone.''
The Hostages Case (United States v. List et al.), Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XI (1950),
p. 1253-4·
10 The customary rule of military necessity may be, and in many instances is, restricted in
its application to the conduct of war by other customary or conventional rules. The opinion
that all rules of war are subject to, and restricted by, the operation of the principle of military
necessity has never been accepted by the majority of American and English authorities. Furthermore, this opinion has not been accepted by military tribunals. It has been held by military
tribunals that the plea of military necessity cannot be considered as a defense for the violations
of rules which lay down absolute prohibitions (e. g., the rule prohibiting the killing of prisoners
of war) and which provide no exception for those circumstances cons.tituting military necessity.
Thus, one United States Military Tribunal, in rejecting the argument that the rules of war are
always subject to the operation of military necessity, stated:
"It is an essence of war that one or the other side must lose and the experienced generals
and statesmen knew this when they drafted the rules and customs of land warf~re. In short
these rules and customs of warfare are designed specifically for all phases of ·war. They
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comprise the law for such emergency. To claim that they can be wan tonly-and at the sole
discretion of any one belligerent-disregarded when he considers his ov.rn situation to be
critical, means nothing more or less than to abrogate the law~ 2-nd custom5 of war entirely."
The Krupp Trial (Trial of Alfred Felix Alwyn Krupp Von Bohlen und Halbach and Eleven Others) ,
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. X (1949), p. I39·
However, there are rules of customary and conventional law which normally prohibit certain
acts but which exceptionally allow a belligerent to commit these normally prohibited acts in
circumstances of military necessity. In conventional rules the precise formulation given to
this exception varies. Some rules contain the clause that they shall be observed "as far as
military necessity (military interests) permits." Other rules permit acts normally forbidden
if "required" or "demanded" by the necessities of war. Rules providing for the exceptional
operation of military necessity require a careful consideration of the relevant circumstances to
determine whether or not the performance of normally prohibited acts is rendered necessary
in order to protect the safety of a belligerent's forces or to facilit ate the success of its military
operations.
11 The opinion is occasionally expressed that these two principles, necessity and humanity,
contradict one another in the sense that they serve opposed ends. This is not the case. In
allowing only that use of force necessary for the purpose of war, the principle of necessity
implies the principle of humanity which disallows any kind or degree of force not essential for
the realization of this purpose; that is, force which needlessly or unnecessarily causes or aggravates both human suffering and physical destruction. Thus, the t wo principles may properly
be described, not as opposing, but as complementing each other. The real difficulty arises, not
from the actual meaning of the principles, but from their application in practice.
12The terms "civilian population" and "noncombatants" are used interchangeably in
Article 2.2.1, and refer to those peaceful inhabitants of a state who neither are attached to, nor
accompany, the armed forces.
It should be observed that the term "noncombatants" also has a more restricted meaning
and refers to certain categories of individuals who are attached to or accompany the armed
forces of a belligerent, e. g., hospital personnel, chaplains, correspondents, etc. The status of
these noncombatant categories is dealt with in the detailed provisions of the 1949 Geneva
Convention for the Protection of Victims of War.
13 In land warfare the noncombatant population must not, as a rule, be deprived of their
private property except with payment therefor when such property must be requisitioned
because of military necessity. However, in naval warfare the private property of the enemy
population, as a rule may be seized and condemned in a court of prize. There are certain minor
exceptions to this general right of seizure of private property at sea, e. g., small coastal (not
deep sea) fishing vessels may only be seized under conditions of military necessity.
14 Recent developments in the methods and weapons of warfare have decidedly affected this
once fundamental distinction between combatants and noncombatants. These developments
have been summarized as follows: growth of the number of combatants; growth of numbers
of noncombatants engaged in war preparations; the development of aerial warfare; economic
measures; and the advent of totalitarian states. (Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law,
Vol. II (7th ed., 1952.), pp. 2.07-8). To the foregoing should be added the development of
guided missiles and atomic and thermonuclear weapons.
The restriction of hostilities to the armed forces of a belligerent is therefore now valid subject
only to far-reaching qualifications, particularly with respect to the conduct of aerial warfare
(see also paragraph 503b for changes in naval wnfare which presently affect the distinction
between combatants and noncombatants). It should be pointed out, however, that the partial
breakdown of the distinction between combatants and noncombatants applies mainly to the
actual conduct of hostilities. The distinction remains quite effective insofar as it applies not
to the conduct of hostilities but to the treatment of the victims of w<:~r who fall under the control of an enemy belligerent. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 have further clarified this dis·
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tinction as it applies to the victims of war in the conventions dealing with the treatment of
prisoners of war and with the protection of civilian persons in time of war.
15 It should be emphasized that despite recent developments in the conduct of warfare, discussed above, the prohibitions against subjecting noncombatants to direct attack unrelated
to a military objective or of attacking them for:the purpose of terrorization remain valid.
16 A state may be neutral, insofar as it does not participate in hostilities, even though it
may be not impartial. Whether or not the successful maintenance of a position of non participation is possible, in the absence of complete impartiality, is quite another question.
17 Article 2. of Hague Convention No. III (1907) Relative to the Opening of Hostilities obligates belligerents to inform neutrals of the existence of a state of war.
"Article 2.. The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without
delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until after the receipt of a notification,
which may, however, be given by telegraph. Neutral Powers, nevertheless, cannot rely on
the absence of notification if it is clearly established that they were in fact aware of the
existence of a state of war."
The above Article is binding between a belligerent state which is a party to Hague Convention No. III (1907) and neutral states which also are parties to the Convention.
18 When the United States is a belligerent, the designation of neutral status of third states
will be promulgated by Department of the Navy directives.
19 In the absence of a Security Council decision, states may discriminate, and even resort to
war, against a state they deem guilty of an illegal armed attack. This follows from Article 5I
of the Charter which stipulates the ''right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . . " (It should also be noted that
under the resolution "Uniting For Peace" the General Assembly of the United Nations may,
in the event of a breach of the peace, make "appropriate recommendations to members for
collective measures, including . . . the use of armed force when necessary . . . " However~ at
present these recommendations of the General Assembly do not constitute legal obligations
for the member states.) In sum, then, although members may discriminate against an aggressor,
even in the absence of any action on the part of the Security Council, they do not have the duty
to do so. In these circumstances neutrality and complete impartiality both remain distinct
possibilities.
2° The principal effect of regional and collective self-defense arrangements is to transform
the right of the parties to assist that state suffering from an armed attack into a duty to assist
a state attacked. This duty may assume various forms, ranging from economic assistance to
the undertaking of measures of armed force on behalf of the state attacked. Article 2. of the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty •
both obligate the contracting states, including the United States, to consider an armed attack
against any contracting party as an armed attack against all of the contracting parties and to
take any and all such measures as each state may consider necessary to assist the state so
attacked.
21 A compilation of the rules of land warfare is contained in Law of Land Warfare, FM 2.7-10
(1956), issued by the Department of the Army, and in supplements thereto.
22 The few provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 pertaining to the conduct
of aerial warfare are generally recognized as no longer valid. The Rules of Aerial Warfare of
February 19, 192.3, drafted by the Commission of Jurists at The Hague, were never ratified by
any of the participating states.
23 An example of a customary rule of war applicable to aerial warfare is the prohibition
against "wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity." (See subparagraph 32.obC6) and Article 62.1). Equally applicable is the customary
rule forbidding the denial of quarter unless bad faith is suspected; though, given the peculiar
conditions of aerial warfare, this rule is frequently difficult to carry out in practice. The relevant Geneva Conventions of 1949, governing the treatment of the sick and wounded and of
prisoners of war, are conventional rules of a general character applicable to air warfare.

370

24 Caution must be exercised in indiscriminately attempting to apply " by analogy" these
specialized rules of land warfare to air warfare. The peculiar conditions of aerial warfare have
occasioned practices unique to this form of warfare. Consequently, the attempt to apply
"by analogy" the specialized rules of land and sea warfare to air warfare may lead frequently
to a disregard of these practices and to this extent be quite misleading. For example, the distinctions made between legitimate ruses and forbidden perfidy are different in land and in naval
warfare. Yet neither the distinctions made in land warfare nor the distinctions made in naval
warfare have been in accordance with the practices of air warfare.
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